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Options for Returning the Value of CO2 Emissions Allowances  
to Households 
Dallas Burtraw and Ian W.H. Parry 
Abstract 
This paper examines alternative ways that the value of CO2 emissions allowances created under 
cap-and-trade policy could be returned to households. One approach (based on principles of economic 
efficiency) is effectively a “tax shift” that would use revenues from an auction of CO2 emissions 
allowances to reduce preexisting distortionary taxes. A second approach (based on principles of property 
rights for common-pool resources), known as cap-and-dividend, would refund allowance value as equal 
lump-sum cash transfers to households. Economic theory suggests (with some caveats) that a tax shift 
would be considerably less costly to the overall economy. In contrast, cap-and-dividend provides ample 
compensation for low-income households, though it appears to be more costly than other approaches, 
including perhaps well-designed regulatory policies. A dividend approach might be combined with other 
policies to provide incentives for households to invest in energy-efficient technologies and thereby lower 
the costs of the carbon policy.  
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Options for Returning the Value of CO2 Emissions Allowances  
to Households 
Dallas Burtraw and Ian W.H. Parry 
1. Introduction 
California is on the verge of implementing a cap-and-trade program to introduce a price 
on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions beginning in 2012, as part of its overall strategy to reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This program will create a new commodity—tradable 
emissions allowances—with substantial market value. For California, the projected value of 
allowances for 2012 is $2.5 billion to $7.5 billion, rising to $7.3 billion to $21.9 billion in 2020 
(2007 dollars).1  
California’s program design could also influence decisions at the national level. A federal 
trading program could generate value of $100 billion to $200 billion a year by 2020.2 This would 
represent the largest creation of a federally enforced property right since the 19th century, when 
the American West was opened to private property ownership. As with land in the western states, 
the air has always been here and had value. What is different with the introduction of cap-and-
trade is the government commitment to enforce an intangible property right guaranteeing use of 
the limited resource. A fundamental question is, To whom should this value belong?  
There are numerous options, and combinations of options, for allocating allowance 
values, with dramatically different implications for the overall economic costs and distributional 
impacts of the cap-and-trade program.  
One option is to auction the allowances and use the revenues to substitute for other taxes, 
like income taxes, either directly or indirectly—by reducing the need to raise revenues from 
other taxes to address structural budget deficits. Taxes in the broader fiscal system have the 
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1 Economic and Allocation Advisory Committee (EAAC 2010). 
2 CBO (2009a) provides the lower estimate. Krupnick et al. (2010) project that recent cap-and-trade proposals would 
limit domestic, energy-related CO2 emissions to about 5.38 billion tons in 2020, with an associated allowance price 
of $33 per ton, implying potential revenues of $178 billion in that year (in 2007 dollars). One difference in these 
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harmful effect of causing a difference between the social value of an activity and its reward, 
which distorts economic activity in various ways. For example, a tax on labor income reduces 
the real (after-tax) wage that workers receive below the value of the activity to the economy, 
with a depressing effect on hours worked, labor force participation, accumulation of skills, and 
so on. Similarly, taxes on the income from saving and investment depress the levels of capital 
accumulation below levels that would otherwise be economically efficient. A wide array of tax 
exemptions and deductions (e.g., for homeownership or employer-provided medical insurance) 
add further distortions by creating a bias toward tax-favored spending.  
Adding a new, environmental or other regulatory burden can be expected to worsen some 
of these preexisting tax distortions, to the extent they contract the overall level of economic 
activity, employment, and investment. At the same time, tax distortions can be alleviated 
(slightly) by using allowance auction revenues to cut the rates of income or payroll taxes. In fact, 
a large body of evidence with simulation modeling suggests that recycling revenues in this way 
would produce relatively large economic efficiency benefits, which would substantially lower 
the overall costs of the cap-and-trade program to the economy. However, there is uncertainty 
about how well these models apply to the California economy, at least in the short run. 
A very different approach, cap-and-dividend, would return auction revenues in equal 
lump-sum transfers (i.e., cash rebates) to households. The value that would accrue to households 
across the bottom half of the income distribution would likely more than compensate for the 
effect of higher energy prices. Equal per capita dividends have been rationalized on the ethical 
premise that all individuals have equal ownership rights to the environment, and therefore 
proceeds from charging for use of the environment should be shared equally. The dividend 
approach is transparent and may help with feasibility because it directly addresses a major 
concern about cap-and-trade programs—that they impose a disproportionately large burden on 
poor households through higher energy prices. But these advantages come at a considerable cost, 
since recycling in the form of cash transfers does not produce economic efficiency benefits.  
Another possibility is to use allowance auction revenues to fund the development and 
adoption of clean-energy technologies that facilitate compliance with the cap-and-trade program. 
However, it is difficult to make general statements about whether such revenue use yields 
significant gains in economic efficiency, without detailed evaluations of the specific programs. 
Yet another option for emissions allowances is simply to give them, and their associated 
property rights, away for free to existing emissions sources, rather than auction them. This Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
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approach may help overcome producers’ opposition to the program, but in fact, this approach 
lost support once it became clear that under Europe’s CO2 Emissions Trading System, power 
companies were earning large windfall profits because the value of allowance giveaways to these 
entities greatly exceeded their compliance costs (e.g., Sijm et al. 2006).  
Given all those choices, the appropriate allocation of allowance value will depend on 
what weight policymakers attach to multiple, and often conflicting, objectives, particularly 
containing overall program costs, addressing ethical or distributional concerns, and promoting 
political feasibility. The role of the economist in this setting is to provide, insofar as the evidence 
allows, some sense of the trade-offs involved among these objectives in the allocation of 
allowance value. A theme of our discussion is that these trade-offs can be quite stark. In 
particular, economic theory suggests that addressing ethical, distributional, and feasibility goals 
can imply considerably higher overall program costs. In fact, using at least some of the revenue 
to execute a tax shift by lowering distortionary taxes may be needed to ensure that costs to the 
economy with cap-and-trade are lower than with other alternatives, including direct regulation 
(Parry and Williams 2010a). 
In 2010, a state advisory committee recommended to the California Air Resources Board, 
the agency responsible for implementation of the state’s GHG law, that tradable emissions 
allowances be distributed through a revenue-raising auction, and that a majority portion of 
allowance value be returned to citizens or consumers.3 The focus of this paper is therefore 
limited to the two main alternatives identified in the second recommendation—cutting income 
taxes and providing per capita lump-sum dividends. Furthermore, the analysis done here and 
decisions made in California can have an important role informing future national policy. 
Our discussion is organized as follows. The next section discusses some further details on 
the policy background. Section 3 provides some approximate sense of the costs of prospective 
cap-and-trade proposals for California under alternative possibilities for allocation of allowance 
value. We also compare outcomes with those under an alternative, regulatory approach, to 
indicate the conditions under which the cap-and-trade approach has a clear advantage. Section 4 
focuses on the burden of cap-and-trade and regulatory approaches across different household 
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program-related goals, such as investment in infrastructure and energy efficiency, as well as adaptation to climate 
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income groups in California, and looks at the trade-offs between distributional objectives and 
policy costs. Section 5 addresses political economy aspects in the choice of revenue use. Section 
6 offers concluding remarks. 
2. Background 
In 2006 California adopted the Global Warming Solutions Act (AB32), requiring the 
state to achieve substantial reductions of GHGs by 2020. The California Air Resources Board 
(CARB) is charged with responsibility for overseeing the development and implementation of a 
plan that will reduce California’s aggregate GHGs to 1990 levels by 2020. As part of the plan, 
CARB intends to launch a statewide cap-and-trade program slated to take effect in 2012.  
Leaving aside, for the moment, interactions with the broader fiscal system, establishing a 
price on economy-wide CO2 emissions is thought to be more cost-effective than regulatory (i.e., 
nonpricing) approaches. A price on emissions helps exploit all potential opportunities for 
emissions reductions throughout the economy. And because all emissions sources face the same 
price, this approach helps equalize marginal compliance costs across different sources, thereby 
minimizing the overall burden of compliance costs for a given target emissions reduction. In 
contrast, a regulatory approach would require multiple sets of standards to try to promote 
behavioral responses (e.g., fuel switching in the power sector, adoption of energy-saving 
technologies by various facilities in each sector). Even under a comprehensive regulatory 
framework, cost-effectiveness would still be sacrificed to the extent that marginal compliance 
costs differ across different emissions sources.4  
There are several ways that a price on CO2 could be introduced to the economy. Each 
possible approach suggests different options for distributing the value that is created.  
                                                 
4 One reason is that regulators lack information that is available to private entities, so they are less able to identify 
the cost-minimizing action for each entity throughout the economy. Regulatory approaches are unlikely to provide 
adequate credit-trading provisions across sectors, so marginal complaince costs are not equated. The introduction of 
a price on CO2 enables private entities to adjust their own investment and operational decisions to independently 
minimize their own costs, given the observed price, and this private behavior is expected to lead to minimum overall 
social cost. A second reason is that the price of goods and services throughout the economy is expected to adjust to 
reflect the price of CO2 under emissions pricing, ensuring adequate incentives for households and firms to reduce 
demand for energy-intenstive agoods.  Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
5 
A cap-and-trade program is just one way that regulators could introduce a price on 
emissions. Cap-and-trade works by limiting the volume of emissions that can occur and enabling 
the trade of emissions allowances among entities that are regulated. A price on CO2 will emerge 
that reflects the marginal cost of achieving emissions reductions. This is the approach taken in 
the implementation of the sulfur dioxide (SO2) trading program that was launched under the 
1990 Clean Air Act amendments, where the value of emissions allowances was assigned to 
incumbent emitters that had been in existence in the 1985–1987 base period. Cap-and-trade also 
has been used to reduce emissions of nitrogen oxides in the Northeast states, which took several 
approaches to distributing allowance value: free allocation to incumbent emitters, free allocation 
to current emitters, direct sale, and a revenue-raising auction. Cap-and-trade programs for CO2 
exist in the European Union (EU) under the Emissions Trading Scheme, which took effect in 
2005. In the first two phases of that program, through 2012, nearly all allowances were given for 
free to incumbent emitters, but a small portion was auctioned, with revenue accruing to EU 
member states. Beginning in 2013, a majority of allowances will be auctioned in the EU, with 
the portion continuing to grow over time. In the United States, 10 Northeast states organized the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which took effect in 2009. In that program, nearly 90 
percent of allowances are auctioned, with a substantial portion of the revenues explicitly directed 
to strategic energy investments and other program-related goals. 
A similar outcome can be accomplished without an emissions cap, but it will be 
somewhat less efficient than cap-and-trade. An example is the tradable performance standard 
program that was used to phase out lead from gasoline in the 1980s under the federal Clean Air 
Act. Under that program a concentration standard limiting the amount of lead per gallon of 
refined product was implemented. Firms could average and trade to achieve the standard, and an 
informal market emerged. More recently, there has been debate about a tradable CO2 per kWh 
standard for the power sector or, similarly, a clean energy portfolio standard requiring firms to 
meet a certain fraction of generation through zero- or low-carbon fuels (e.g., Palmer et al. 2010). 
One interesting distinction in these programs is that an explicit assignment of the value does not 
occur under a tradable performance standard because there is no fixed emissions cap. Rather, 
value accrues implicitly to the firm only with each unit of production as it forms the basis for 
calculating performance.  
Another way that a price can be introduced on CO2 is through an emissions tax, such as 
has been implemented by Denmark, Sweden, and British Columbia, Canada. An emissions tax 
has a specific connotation regarding the assignment of value because revenue is collected and is Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
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available to the government. The decision of how the government uses the revenue collected 
under a tax parallels the general expenditure questions that constitute the government’s budget 
process. 
In contrast, under cap-and-trade, the government could auction allowances or it could 
directly give free allowances to a variety of entities.5 There are many claimants for the ownership 
rights of emissions allowances. This paper focuses on the return of allowance value to citizens 
and two possible ways this could be achieved, which we label succinctly as tax reform and 
dividends.  
3. Cost-Effectivness 
Assessing the costs of cap-and-trade, and alternative climate mitigation policies, is 
complex not least because their costs depend inevitably on how policies interact with distortions 
in the economy created by the broader fiscal system. In the first part of this section we focus on 
the issues associated with the tax system, and in the second we address the relevance of other 
government spending priorities. We then discuss the potential interaction with other government 
expenditures. 
A. Initial Assessment of Mitigation Costs (Ignoring Prior Tax Distortions)  
We attempt to boil this issue down to the basics using a highly stylized discussion to give 
some rough empirical sense of alternative policy costs. We begin by discussing policy costs in 
the (unrealistic) case when there are no preexisting taxes in the economy. Subsequently, the 
analysis is extended to account for linkages between climate policies and the broader fiscal 
system, under alternative assumptions about revenue use. Our focus is limited to the cost side of 
policies—we do not discuss the climate-related benefits of emissions mitigation policies.6 
                                                 
5 In principle, the same distributional result could occur under a carbon tax through exemptions from the new tax or 
use of carbon tax revenues to pay for various tax reliefs. In practice, however, granting emissions allowances 
implies conveyance of a property right to private parties that is not a component of an emissions tax.  
6 Recent studies review evidence on the benefits per ton from reducing CO2. Most of these reviews point to values in 
the range of about $15 to $35 per ton (in 2010 dollars). However, the valuation of future global warming damages 
(or the benefits from slowing projected climate change) remains highly contentious. Much higher estimates are 
obtained if global warming damages to future generations are discounted (based on ethical grounds) at rates that are 
well below market interest rates or under alternative models of extreme catastrophic risks to the planet. For a review, 
see, for example, IAWG (2010).  Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
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The economic cost, known as welfare cost or deadweight loss, from a broad-based cap-
and-trade program to reduce CO2 emissions represents the costs of all the behavioral responses to 
reduce emissions that are induced by the policy. Suppose, for now, that there are no distortions in 
the economy due to taxes or other market imperfections. Following basic and long-established 
principles in public finance (e.g., Harberger 1964), we can represent the welfare costs, in a given 
year, of a CO2 cap-and-trade system as the area under the marginal cost curve for reducing CO2 
emissions. 
Marginal costs of a cap-and-trade system are represented by the lower upward-sloping 
curve in Figure 1, where emissions reductions due to the cap below  (the emissions level in the 
absence of policy) are shown moving from left to right along the horizontal axis, and the cost of 
the last ton reduced (i.e., the marginal cost) is the height of the curve. The marginal cost is 
initially zero, reflecting the lack of a price on CO2 emissions in the absence of policy. That is, 
without a price on emissions, fossil fuels are used up to the point where the benefit from extra 
use (e.g., the value of extra electricity produced or extra automobile travel) equals the 
incremental cost of supplying fossil fuels. Therefore, reducing emissions by a very small amount 
would entail essentially no welfare cost because the benefits forgone (from reduced fossil fuel 
consumption) would be approximately offset by the savings in supply costs. However, as the 
emissions reduction becomes progressively larger, the price on emissions (given by the price of 
emissions allowances) rises, and this results in giving up progressively more valuable uses of 
fossil fuels, implying a rising marginal cost schedule for emissions reductions. 
Suppose emissions are reduced by an amount in Figure 1 and the corresponding price on 
emissions is given by p. Then, making the assumption that the marginal cost curve is linear 
(which is probably a reasonable approximation for the range of emissions reductions considered 
here), the total annual cost of the emissions reduction is simply the area of the shaded triangle in 
Figure 1, equal to  .  
How large are these costs? The prospective cap-and-trade program in California will limit 
CO2 emissions to 365 million tons in 2020. However, the level of 2020 emissions in the absence 
of the cap and the projected allowance price under the cap are uncertain because they depend, in 
particular, on future growth in energy demand, fuel prices, and the availability and cost of 
cleaner technologies. Based on the report of California’s Economic and Allocation Advisory 
Committee (EAAC 2010), we illustrate possibilities where the cap cuts emissions by 10, 15, or 
20 percent below levels that would otherwise prevail in 2020. This implies that emissions 
without the cap would be approximately 406 million, 429 million, or 456 million tons, Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
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respectively. Also based on EAAC (2010), the allowance prices associated with these scenarios 
are assumed to be $20, $40, or $60 per ton, respectively (all prices and costs here are expressed 
in year 2007 dollars). Then, using our simple formula, the estimated total cost of the policy in 
2020 would be $0.4 billion, $1.3 billion, or $2.7 billion, depending on the allowance price 
scenario (see row 1, Table 1).  
In our analysis so far, the costs of a carbon tax would be the same as under a 
corresponding cap-and-trade program if the tax rate per ton of emissions were set equal to the 
allowance price in the equivalently scaled cap-and-trade system. The cost of a nonmarket 
regulatory alternative is likely to be higher, however. To see this, consider an emissions 
performance standard for the electric power generation sector, where the regulation is “smart” in 
terms of allowing credit trading among suppliers. Under this policy, power generators would be 
required to limit the CO2 emissions rate per unit of generation to a given level through shifting 
their fuel mix (e.g., increasing the share of renewables) and/or purchasing credits from suppliers 
whose emissions rates are below the standard. The emissions standard would affect electricity 
prices less than a cap-and-trade system (achieving the same emissions reductions) and would 
therefore be less effective at exploiting CO2 reductions through reduced electricity demand (e.g., 
Palmer et al. 2010). Nor does the policy by itself exploit CO2 emissions reductions outside the 
power sector (e.g., through reduced use of automobiles or reduced industrial fuel consumption).7  
The marginal cost schedule for the emissions performance standard in isolation will have 
a steeper slope than that for cap-and-trade, as indicated in Figure 1. How much more costly is 
this approach? According to Palmer et al. (2009), approximately 50 percent of the CO2 
reductions under California’s prospective cap-and-trade program will come from fuel switching 
in the power sector. In terms of Figure 1, this means that the emissions allowance price of p 
would generate reductions of  from fuel switching. In turn, this means that the marginal cost for a 
                                                 
7 The emissions performance standard for the power sector is essentially equivalent to a cap-and-trade policy 
confined to the power sector, where all the emissions allowances are auctioned and given free to local distribution 
companies with the expectation that the allowance value will not be passed forward into higher electricity prices. In 
practice, under an emissions performance standard, the absolute level of emissions is not fixed but moves with 
changes in the level of production. If the standard is adjusted to achieve the same emissions target, the price of 
emissions allowances will rise. Palmer et al. (2009) estimate the effect of free allocation to local distribution 
companies on behalf of electricity consumers within a cap-and-trade program in the Western Climate Initiative 
region. This allocation approach has approximately the same effect on electricity prices as would an emissions 
performance standard while holding emissions fixed. They find this approach leads to a 22.6 percent increase in the 
allowance price. Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
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policy that exploits fuel switching would be only (approximately) twice as steep as the marginal 
cost for cap-and-trade. That is, if an emissions rate standard for the electricity sector were used 
as the exclusive mechanism to achieve an emissions reduction of  in 2020, according to our 
highly simplified analysis, the total costs would be about twice as large as under comprehensive 
cap-and-trade.  
In Table 1 we illustrate cases where regulatory approaches cover 30, 50, and 70 percent 
of the opportunities for reducing CO2 that would be exploited under cap-and-trade. Greater 
coverage might be obtained by combining emissions rate standards with, for example, energy 
efficiency standards.8 Costs are about 40 percent greater (when the coverage rate is 70 percent) 
to 230 percent greater (when the coverage rate is 30 percent) than under cap-and-trade (compare 
rows 2–4 in Table 1 with row 1). Moreover, this assumes marginal compliance costs are equated 
across different generation sources—in the absence of a comprehensive credit-trading program, 
compliance costs under regulatory approaches would be larger still (e.g., Newell and Stavins 
2003).  
The discussion so far has underscored the traditional case for market-based approaches in 
general over regulatory alternatives for emissions control. Given their narrow focus, regulatory 
approaches—even if designed with flexible credit-trading programs—are potentially a lot more 
costly because they exploit fewer emissions reduction opportunities.  
Nonetheless, as discussed later, the distributional effects of regulatory approaches may be 
more benign, given their much weaker effect on energy prices. Most important for this section, 
however, is that by omitting an important component of overall welfare costs, the above 
discussion obscures important distinctions among cap-and-trade systems with different 
allowance allocations, and the costs of these policies relative to regulatory approaches.  
B. Full Welfare Assessment of Mitigation Costs (Accounting for Prior Tax 
Distortions)  
It has long been recognized among public finance economists that the welfare effects of 
any new policy intervention in the economy depend on how the policy affects preexisting 
distortions away from economic efficiency created by the broader tax system, as well as market 
                                                 
8 In fact, CARB has identified specific measures that are expected to achieve more than 80 percent of the emissions 
reductions that would be required by 2020 and that, potentially, could be regulated. Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
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failures like unpriced pollution emissions (e.g., Lipsey and Lancaster 1956). Harberger (1964) 
developed a general formula for this welfare cost, which depends on the size of distortions in 
other markets (e.g., tax rates or the magnitude of pollution damages) times the behavioral 
response (or quantity changes), as a result of the new policy, in markets affected by these 
distortions. In what sense is this relevant for the costs of California climate policies? 
In this subsection we discuss the theory of how taxes distort economic activity and ways 
in which the welfare costs of carbon policies depend on how they affect these distortions.  
How Do Preexisting Taxes Distort Economic Activity?  
Figure 2 illustrates how the tax system distorts the labor market. The height of the 
demand for labor curve reflects the value of the output that would be produced from additional 
use of labor inputs. In Figure 2, this curve is drawn to be flat, which reflects the common 
assumption that, in the long run, output expands in proportion to increases in labor input along 
with increases in other inputs like capital (e.g., Hamermesh 1986). The height of the labor supply 
curve reflects the opportunity cost to the last worker of being in the labor force—that is, the 
value of the time given up that could have been spent in child rearing, leisure, other home 
activities, and so on. As the household wage rate increases, this may encourage, for example, a 
previously nonworking spouse to join the labor force, an older worker to delay retirement, and an 
existing worker to put in more hours on the job. As a consequence of all these behavioral 
responses, the labor supply curve is upward sloping (evidence on this is discussed below). 
In the absence of any tax distortions, the quantity of labor supply would be L
* in Figure 2. 
This follows given that, in a competitive market, the wage paid by firms approximates the value 
of the marginal product of labor (i.e., the value of the last unit of labor supply to production), 
while people join the labor force up to the point where the wage just compensates the last worker 
for the value of her forgone time. L
* therefore represents the economically efficient amount of 
work effort.  
However, a variety of taxes combine to drive a wedge between the costs to employers of 
hiring labor and the net wages received by households. These include federal income taxes, state 
income taxes, and Social Security taxes paid by employers and employees. They also include 
sales taxes, which reduce the real return to work effort (i.e., the amount of goods that can be 
purchased with wage income) in the same way that direct taxes do. The combination of all these 
taxes is represented by t in Figure 2, which drives a wedge of tw between the gross wage paid by 
firms (w) and the net of tax wage received by households ((1-t)w). The equilibrium employment Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
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level, L
0, is below the efficient level, causing a welfare cost indicated by the light-shaded 
triangle. This loss represents the value of forgone production compared with the efficient level 
(the area under the demand curve between L
0 and L
*) less the value of the additional time in the 
nonmarket sector (the area under the supply curve between L
0 and L
*).  
Now suppose that a new climate policy raises energy costs, leading to a general increase 
in the consumer price level that, in turn, reduces the real household wage. Theory suggests this 
would lead to a reduction in labor supply at any given nominal wage (1-t)w, causing the supply 
curve to shift to the left, albeit very slightly. The resulting welfare loss is shown by the dark-
shaded rectangle in Figure 2, with base equal to the labor supply reduction and height equal to 
the tax wedge (the difference between the social benefit and cost per unit of labor supply). 
Conversely, there would be a corresponding welfare gain to the extent that a new policy 
increased labor supply.  
A caveat here is that changes in labor supply may not be fully reflected in changes in 
labor market equilibrium during periods of high unemployment when job opportunities are 
harder to come by. At the national level, the average unemployment rate from 1976 to 2009 was 
6.2 percent, but in 2009 it spiked to 9.3 percent. In California the average rate over this period 
was 7.0 percent, but it was 11.4 percent in 2009 (Table 4). It is worth noting that individual 
willingness to make investments in human capital that increase productivity may remain 
responsive to changes in the expected long-run real wage even in periods of high unemployment. 
The theory and analysis we present apply on average over the business cycle with greater 
relevance in the longer run, when labor markets have overcome transitory bouts of involuntary 
unemployment.9 
Like the labor market, the capital market is also distorted by preexisting taxes (e.g., 
corporate income taxes, personal taxes on unearned income, capital gains taxes) that drive a 
wedge between the gross rate of return on investments to business and the net rate of return on 
saving. According to theory, there would be analogous welfare effects in the capital market (to 
those in the labor market) if allowance value were used to reduce taxes on capital.  
                                                 
9 Other important assumptions that underpin economic theory, and that are sometimes called into question, include 
equating the wage with the value of the marginal product. There are reasons that the wage may differ from this value 
for extended periods of time, though probably not by enough to make an appreciable difference to our calculations, 
below. Also, it is possible that individual labor supply decisions may not respond symmetrically to changes in sales 
or income taxes, as we assume they do to a change in the pretax wage. Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
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Furthermore, not only does the tax system create distortions in labor and capital markets, 
but it also distorts the pattern of spending—that is, the composition of goods produced in the 
economy. In particular, the tax system creates a bias in favor of goods that are exempt from, or 
deductible from, income and payroll taxes. These tax preferences cause an excessive amount of 
spending on tax-favored goods like employer-provided medical insurance and owner-occupied 
housing, at the expense of ordinary (non-tax-favored) spending.10  
Welfare Gains from Cutting Distortionary Taxes 
There is general acceptance of the proposition that using new revenue sources to reduce 
distortionary preexisting taxes produces a gain in economic efficiency. Revenue from an 
allowance auction could be used for this purpose. The efficiency gain, which is termed the 
revenue-recycling effect (e.g., Goulder 1995), has two components. 
First, obviously, is the amount of revenue used in this fashion. The maximum amount of 
revenue that could be raised from a cap-and-trade policy is indicated by the rectangle with height 
p in Figure 1 and base equal to the actual level of emissions , where  would be the emissions 
level in the absence of policy. Revenue would be lower to the extent that emissions allowances 
were given away for free. Moreover, not all of the revenue raised may be used to reduce other 
taxes. We denote the amount of revenue raised and used to cut other taxes by , where  is the 
fraction of emissions allowances that are auctioned and  is the fraction of revenue used to cut 
distortionary taxes. The second component of the revenue-recycling effect is the efficiency gain 
per dollar of revenue that is used to cut distortionary taxes, which is essentially the same as the 
marginal excess burden (MEB) of taxation.11 In Figure 1, the revenue-recycling effect is 
therefore indicated by the shaded rectangle, which has area . 
                                                 
10 It might be argued that these tax preferences are addressing some source of market failure, in which case they are 
not distortionary. However, our sense is that there may be little validity to this claim. Health economists tend to 
view the tax preference for medical insurance as more of a historical accident than a policy to correct market failures 
in health care provision. And although homeownership may confer some broader community benefits (e.g., if people 
take better care of their homes and gardens when they own rather than rent), there are counteracting effects (e.g., 
loss of open space and added congestion if the tax preference encourages urban sprawl). The failure to fully charge 
developers for the costs of new infrastructure (schools, roads, etc.) required for additional housing further raises the 
likelihood that too much, rather than too little, is spent on residential housing development. The alternative 
minimum tax, which caps mortgage and other tax deductions for high-income earners, does limit tax preferences, 
though this is taken into account in the studies we use to infer a value for the MEB.  
11 The MEB is the efficiency loss from an increase in distortionary taxes, expressed per dollar of extra revenue 
raised. Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
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How Large Is the Gain from Revenue Recycling?  
We use what we believe is a reasonable value, 0.35, for the MEB (i.e., 35 cents of 
welfare gain per dollar recycled in tax cuts).  
Based on older literature that focuses on labor market distortions only, a typical estimate 
for the MEB is around 0.25 based on compensated labor supply responses, and around 0.15 
based on uncompensated responses.12 The compensated response is applicable to our case. This 
is because we are comparing labor supply responses from an uncompensated tax cut with labor 
supply responses when instead revenue is returned to the private sector in lump-sum 
compensation. In both cases there is an income effect; therefore, comparing one case with 
another leaves only the substitution effect. 
However, following Feldstein (1999), public finance economists have been concerned 
with measuring the combined costs of distortions created by changes to the tax system, including 
the distortions in factor markets and also the shifting between tax-favored and ordinary (non-tax-
favored) spending. The combined effect can be inferred by estimating how taxable income (i.e., 
earnings from labor and capital less tax-favored spending) responds to changes in tax rates. The 
empirical evidence on this is carefully reviewed by Saez et al. (2009), for uncompensated price 
changes, and based on this, Parry and Williams (2010b) estimate an MEB of 0.25, with a 
plausible range of about 0.10 to 0.40. We use 0.35 to make some allowance for the larger labor 
supply response to a compensated price change. 
The maximum welfare gains from revenue recycling, based on empirical measures and 
economic theory, are indicated in Table 1. We term these the maximum potential gains when all 
allowances are auctioned and all revenues finance a general reduction in marginal income tax 
rates or sales taxes (i.e., ). A large amount of revenue is raised when allowances are fully 
auctioned in 2020—$7.3 billion to $21.9 billion under different scenarios for the allowance 
price. And the welfare gains from using all this revenue to cut distortionary taxes is substantial, 
$2.6 billion to $7.7 billion under our MEB value (see row 5, Table 1), or 2.8 to 6.4 times the 
costs as previously estimated under the assumption of no preexisting taxes.  
                                                 
12 See, for example, Browning (1987), Ballard et al. (1985), and Stuart (1984). These estimates are based on 
empirical studies of labor supply responses to changes in household wages, averaging over male and female 
workers, and accounting for changes both in hours worked on the job and in labor force participation rates. The most 
important component of the labor supply response is the participation decision by married females.  Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
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Effect of Higher Energy Prices on Tax Distortions 
The potential revenue that is raised under an allowance auction results from introducing a 
price on CO2 emissions via a cap-and-trade system. This new price on CO2 causes higher fuel 
and electricity prices and consequently a general increase in the costs of producing goods and 
services throughout the economy. As a result, the real wage will decline, as will the real rate of 
return on capital. In other words, the price increase acts like an “implicit” tax and could be 
expected to affect labor supply and capital accumulation in the same way as do other 
distortionary taxes (e.g., Goulder 1995). Consequently, we would expect the quantity of work 
effort and capital accumulation to fall, resulting in a welfare loss, which has been termed the tax-
interaction effect (Goulder 1995). Although the effect of carbon policy on economy-wide labor 
supply (the base of the rectangle in Figure 2) is small, the welfare loss per unit reduction in labor 
supply (the height of the rectangle) is large, given that federal and state income taxes, employer 
and employee payroll taxes, and sales taxes combine to drive a large wedge of around 35–40 
percent between the gross wage paid by firms and the net of tax wage received by households. 
Consequently, the tax-interaction effect significantly increases overall policy costs. 
Economists have paid considerable attention to the issue of whether the welfare loss from 
the tax-interaction effect is smaller or larger than the gain from the revenue-recycling effect 
(under an environmental tax, like a carbon tax, or a cap-and-trade system with full allowance 
auctions). In models that capture only the distortions in factor markets created by the tax system, 
the typical finding is that the tax-interaction effect exceeds the revenue-recycling effect (e.g., 
Bovenberg and Goulder 2002; Schoeb 2006).13  
Moreover, as explained above, the tax system also creates a bias toward tax-preferred 
spending, and allowing for this increases the revenue-recycling effect. In contrast, the tax-
interaction effect is largely unaffected by tax preferences: higher energy prices induce little 
substitution between tax-favored and non-tax-favored spending, given that the energy intensity 
of these product categories is broadly similar. As a result, the welfare gains from the revenue 
                                                 
13 This finding is consistent with a large literature in public finance that explores what an optimal (economically 
efficient) tax system would look like (e.g., Sandmo 1976). A basic insight from this literature is that (leaving aside 
pollution and other market failures) taxes on narrowly defined products, or intermediate goods like fuels and 
electricity, are generally more costly (i.e., cause more economic distortion) than broader-based taxes like labor 
income taxes, for a given amount of revenue raised. Consequently, imposing a narrow-based tax and using the 
revenues to lower a broad-based tax will tend to increase the overall distortionary costs of the tax system. Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
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recycling effect can actually dominate welfare losses from the tax-interaction effect (e.g., Parry 
and Bento 2000).  
One further point is that preexisting tax distortions have less dramatic implications for the 
overall welfare costs of regulatory policies. Although these policies do not raise revenue, they 
also have a much weaker effect on energy prices and production costs in general than 
(comparatively scaled) CO2 pricing policies, as there is no analog to the pass-through of 
allowance value in higher prices. Consequently, regulatory policies will have a weaker adverse 
effect on economy-wide employment, investment, and so on from higher energy costs (e.g., 
Goulder et al. 1999).  
In Table 1 we provide an approximate estimate of the tax-interaction effect under 
alternative climate policies, based on applying formulas for cost markups due to fiscal 
interactions that are derived and discussed in Goulder et al. (1999) and Parry and Williams 
(2010b). 
For the cap-and-trade policy, the tax-interaction effect falls somewhat short of the full 
revenue-recycling effect, as indicated by a comparison of rows 5 and 6 in Table 1. For example, 
for the $20 allowance price scenario, the revenue-recycling benefit is $2.6 billion (per year in 
2020), while the tax-interaction effect costs $1.9 billion. When revenues are used to reduce 
preexisting taxes, the net effect of fiscal interactions is therefore to lower the overall costs of the 
policy. For example, in this case the overall costs of the policy fall from $0.4 billion when prior 
tax distortions are ignored to negative $0.2 billion (compare rows 1 and 7 in Table 1). That is, in 
this case the shift from the labor income tax to auction revenues for CO2 would lead to economic 
improvements before accounting for any of the benefits of climate policy. 
In contrast, for the cap-and-trade system where there is no revenue-recycling effect, 
policy costs increase significantly when taking just the tax-interaction effect into consideration, 
as can be seen by comparing rows 1 and 9 in Table 1. Costs increase by 222, 309, and 475 
percent for the $60, $40, and $20 allowance price scenarios, respectively.  
The costs of regulatory approaches are also higher because of fiscal interactions, but the 
cost increase is much more measured because the change in product prices is smaller. Comparing 
rows 11 and 2, rows 13 and 3, and rows 15 and 4 from Table 1, we see that in each case costs 
increase by an estimated 25 percent. Consequently, the overall costs of the regulatory policy can 
be smaller than for the cap-and-trade policy with no revenue recycling. In fact (comparing rows 
11, 13, and 15 with row 9 in Table 1), in seven of the nine cases the regulatory policy is less Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
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costly to the overall economy than cap-and-trade with no revenue recycling, even though the 
regulatory policy places “too much” burden on some abatement opportunities and “too little” on 
others. (Again, bear in mind the caveat that our assumed regulatory policy is smart in terms of 
equating marginal compliance costs across covered emissions sources within a sector.) 
Summary, with Qualifications 
Economic theory suggests there are significant distortions in labor and capital markets, 
and in the pattern of spending, due to the tax system and tax-sheltering provisions. Climate 
policy, whether implemented as a new regulation or as cap-and-trade, tends to compound 
distortions in labor and capital markets because higher energy costs have a (slight) contractive 
effect on economic activity, employment, and investment. The magnitude of this effect is likely 
to be greater under cap-and-trade because of the introduction of a price on CO2. Using the 
revenue from an auction of emissions allowances to reduce preexisting taxes can offset, or 
perhaps more than offset, a large portion of the cost of cap-and-trade. However, theory suggests 
that if revenues from an auction are not used to reduce preexisting taxes, the welfare cost of cap-
and-trade policy could be much greater, possibly even greater than direct regulation of CO2 
emissions. 
Some reasons for caution. We should be careful not take the above theoretical results as 
fact, however, because there are always uncertainties in measuring projected policy effects and 
there is always a risk that a given economic model has missed something of importance. For 
example, the MEB is estimated with a fair degree of uncertainty, though it is still appropriate to 
use a value reflecting middle of the range estimates; today’s best judgment may change in light 
of future evidence. Here we comment on some further qualifications.    
First, as noted, the labor supply effect of carbon policies may be more muted in the short 
term because of the currently slack labor market. The persistence of high unemployment may 
mean that change in labor supply might not lead to change in labor market equilibrium.  
Second, on the other hand, if the tax cut is targeted on capital rather than on labor (e.g., if 
business taxes rather than personal taxes are reduced), the welfare gains from the revenue-
recycling effect can be larger, given that the MEB for taxes on capital is thought to exceed that 
for taxes on labor (e.g., Bovenberg and Goulder 1997; Judd 1987). However, cutting business 
taxes would likely be viewed as less equitable than cutting household taxes. 
A third consideration is whether the above estimates of the MEB, which are based on 
national-level data, are reasonable for California. State-level personal income taxes and sales Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
17 
taxes together represent 8.9 percent of personal household income in California (Table 2). These 
taxes are higher, but only moderately, than the corresponding tax rates averaged across all states 
(7.8 percent). Moreover, what matters for the MEB is the combined distortion from both state 
and federal taxes. Accounting for the latter, as indicated in Table 2, the overall (average) tax rate 
on California income is 36.1 percent which is not that much larger in relative terms than for the 
nation as a whole (34.6 percent). Furthermore, we see no obvious reason why behavioral 
responses to tax changes in California should be significantly higher, or significantly lower, than 
the national average. In the absence of evidence on the latter point, it seems reasonable to use the 
same MEB value for California as for the national economy. 
Finally, the efficiency gains from revenue recycling will depend on the specifics of the 
tax cut. Implicitly, behind the MEB estimates is a proportional change in marginal income tax 
rates—at the federal or state level—across all household income groups. If instead the tax cut 
took the form of an increase in personal income tax thresholds (the income below which the 
marginal tax rate is zero), the gains in economic efficiency would be considerably smaller. This 
policy would encourage more labor force participation among lower-income persons or second-
income earners in the household, because it increases the net take-home pay from working. 
However, it would not exploit other behavioral responses that depend on marginal (rather than 
average) tax rates, like working harder on the job or shifting from tax-favored to non-tax-favored 
spending. On the other hand, we would expect a cut in the sales tax to produce welfare gains 
comparable to those from a general reduction in marginal income tax rates, because it would 
exploit the same margins of behavior. In particular, lower sales taxes would increase the real rate 
of return on all work effort (whether through increased hours on the job or through increased 
participation rates) and would also alleviate the bias toward tax-preferred expenditures, which 
are largely exempt from sales taxation. 
C. Interactions with Other Program Goals  
Addressing climate change will require dramatic technological change. A price on CO2 is 
a useful tool to bring into the market innovations that are commercially available, but many 
observers believe it is unlikely that the political process will support a price that is sufficient to Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
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accelerate research and development upstream in the lifecycle of innovation.14 Furthermore, the 
magnitude of investment that is necessary is substantial. The International Energy Agency 
(2008) estimates that to cut today’s emissions levels by half will require additional investments 
(beyond the baseline) of roughly $45 trillion. The vast majority of this investment will have to 
come from private sources.  
The timing of investment is also important—to capture near-term opportunities to reduce 
emissions, to alter the nature of infrastructure that will be in place over the next century, and to 
accelerate the process of innovation. Although some element of technological change will result 
from major breakthroughs relating to important new technologies, such as carbon capture and 
storage, most of it is likely to proceed from incremental discovery and innovation that result 
from commercialization of incremental technological improvements (e.g., Alic et al. 2003). 
Near-term investments contribute to accumulated capital of technological knowledge as well as 
physical infrastructure. 
In the case of California, agencies and advisory committees have identified public 
investment priorities related to the emissions reductions goals of the state (EAAC 2010, ETAAC 
2008, 2009, EJAC 2008). These include the need for new transportation infrastructure, 
investment in the electricity grid to facilitate transmission of renewable energy from remote 
regions, smart electricity meters that provide improved pricing information to consumers, 
research and development into clean energy technologies, efficiency upgrades in schools and 
other public buildings, community-based support for mitigation and adaptation, and support for 
weatherization and other energy-saving capital purchases by businesses and households, 
especially low-income households. Furthermore, there is interest in recycling revenues back to 
the economy in ways that are most effective in helping the economy recover from the present 
recession.  
                                                 
14 Survey research on attitudes toward environmental and climate policy suggest that the U.S. public is in favor of 
efforts to reduce emissions of GHGs but doesn’t want to pay an explicit price, such as a carbon tax, to achieve those 
reductions. The U.S. public has a clear preference for action in the electricity sector, and a preference for standards 
over cap-and-trade or taxes (Bannon et al. 2007). Further, survey research indicates that Americans continue to be 
extremely anxious about the cost of energy, and investment in clean technology is the most popular policy option 
(American Environics/EMC 2007). The public appears to like its taxes hidden, and imposing a technology standard 
on CO2 emitters may be one way to impose reductions without introducing an explicit tax or allowance price to the 
economy.  Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
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It is difficult to make general statements about the merits or drawbacks of these broader 
alternatives in the absence of specific evidence on the benefit and costs of spending measures, 
accounting for possible “market failures” that they might address. In a companion paper, Farbes 
and Kammen (2010) present an assessment of the aggregate social benefits of these spending 
priorities. Whatever the benefits, it is clear that public policy reflects the belief that for equity, 
efficiency, or other reasons, public investments to address these priorities are important.  
In sum, the need for investment in new technology is substantial. It is unlikely to be 
realized fully from incentives put in place by cap-and-trade or from public funding. Moreover, 
the need is timely. Consequently, in Section 5 we consider how value that is created by the 
introduction of a price on CO2 and potentially returned to households might reinforce goals to 
increase investment in energy-efficient technology.  
4. Distributional Implications 
Besides its overall economic cost, the consequences of carbon policy for individual 
households also depend on its distributional burden. Distributional incidence is a limited measure 
of well-being because it compares only relative effects, not absolute effects. If all households 
were made better off but high-income households were made much better off (as a proportion of 
income) relative to low-income households, a distributional analysis would describe the policy as 
regressive. Conversely, even if the policy made everyone worse off but had a larger effect on 
high-income households (relative to their income), a distributional analysis would describe the 
policy as progressive.  
In this section we focus on the relative effect on households across the income 
distribution. Again, we compare the options of tax reform (representing a proportional reduction 
in the income tax burden across all households) and dividends, but using a study projecting 
effects for the year 2016. We evaluate the tax reform option as a proportional reduction in the 
income tax burden. We assume that this reflects the preferences of policymakers regarding the 
distribution of the tax burden in general, and that changes in marginal rates are aligned to 
achieve this result.  
We analyze results in a partial equilibrium framework, which means we account for the 
net resource costs (policy costs with no prior tax distortions) across households. Since there is no 
behavioral response through the tax system, the effect under these two policies on the average 
household is equal. Data for this analysis are based on the Consumer Expenditure Survey for the Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
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years 2004–2008.15 Information about marginal and average tax rates, including federal and state 
income and payroll taxes, comes from the Congressional Budget Office (2005). The model 
accounts for automatic indexing of tax brackets and benefit programs, such as Social Security 
programs, in response to inflation. Additional details for how the policies are modeled can be 
found in Blonz et al. (2010). 
One important consideration in this analysis is the effect of a cap-and-trade program on 
government’s own expenditures. One way the government is affected is through the change in 
the cost of direct energy expenditures. Federal, state, and local governments account for 14 
percent of total energy expenditures. Consequently, to keep government budgets whole, we 
withhold 14 percent of the allowance value.16 Although the setting in this study is California, we 
assume that changes in costs at federal facilities in the state lead to an increase in costs at all 
levels of government. This increase in costs ultimately affects household budgets, so for a 
distributional assessment we account for this cost by deducting value from the pool of emissions 
allowances. 
This model for California is built on a national climate policy, where abatement, goods 
price changes, and allowance price are calibrated at the national level. Nonelectricity abatement 
behavior is taken from the Energy Information Administration’s analysis of H.R. 2454 (EIA 
2009). The electricity sector is modeled within RFF’s electricity market model, called Haiku. 
Residential electricity is regionally disaggregated, with California-specific price and demand 
changes, along with the CO2 content of electricity generation in California and neighboring 
states, to reflect the emissions intensity of electricity actually consumed in the state.  
Income deciles in the analysis are constructed nationally. California’s average income is 
$11,269 higher than the national income, meaning more households reside in higher national 
income deciles. As a result, California has an asymmetric number of observations in each decile 
                                                 
15 There are drawbacks to using annual income to assess a household’s ability to bear the burden of a tax or other 
policy. It has been argued that a measure of “permanent” or “lifetime” income is a better metric than annual income 
by which to categorize households for the effects over time, but this measure is difficult to implement. Studies that 
use lifetime income—often proxied by annual consumption expenditures—generally find that carbon taxes and cap-
and-trade systems look much less regressive over lifetime income (Fullerton and Rogers 1993; Walls and Hanson 
1999; Burtraw et al. 2009; Hassett et al. 2009). 
16 CBO (2009a) predicts that this cost for federal, state, and local government combined will be 14 percent of allowance 
value; CBO (2009b) predicts it will be 13 percent. Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
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(Table 3). Average incomes within deciles, however, do not differ significantly from the national 
averages, since they represent the average income of those Californians who fall within the 
nationally defined deciles. Also note that family size (persons per household) varies across the 
income distribution in California (and also for the nation). 
The results from Table 3 are displayed graphically in Figure 3. The picture that emerges 
from the data in Table 3 indicates that a reduction in income tax rates is regressive across the 
entire income distribution. Households in the bottom nine income deciles (defined at the national 
level) are made worse off, but households in the top income decile (which constitutes 15 percent 
of the households in our sample for California) benefit. The dividends approach has nearly the 
opposite result. Households in the bottom five income deciles are strictly better off under the 
policy, and households in the sixth decile about break even under the dividend policy. 
In the absence of effects from interaction with the tax system, a dividend approach would 
appear to be better for households through the eighth income decile nationally. In our sample this 
constitutes 72 percent of all households in California. That evidence would seem to suggest that 
a dividend approach could be politically popular. 
We also conduct analysis using consumption quintiles rather than income quintiles. 
Current consumption often is based to some degree on lifetime or permanent income, rather than 
on current income alone. For example, some households with low current earnings might 
actually be consuming at a higher level because of their position in their career path (beginning 
or retirement) or other factors.  
The results regarding the distribution across the lifetime income quintiles (proxied by 
annual consumption) are similar to those with annual income quintiles, but the regressivity is 
diminished. The distributional effect of using revenue from an allowance auction to reduce 
income taxes appears less regressive, and the dividend approach appears somewhat more 
progressive, when evaluating annual consumption rather than annual income.  
In all cases, the absolute levels of effect on households vary from that which would 
emerge if the analysis were to include interactions with the tax system. That approach, built on 
the assumption (described previously) that in the long run, equilibrium in labor markets will 
respond to changes in labor supply, would show the dividend approach to be more costly overall, 
and under most scenarios it would be more costly for all income groups. None of these analyses 
are able to account for interactions with expenditure priorities. If distribution of a dividend could Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
22 
be designed to improve the effectiveness of other government priorities, as we discuss in other 
sections, such an approach could reduce its cost. 
5. Political Economy Considerations 
We discuss three aspects of political economy in the subsections below. First we discuss 
the philosophical framework for emissions trading versus taxes. Second, we discuss the practical 
political issues of the choice of a tax shift versus dividends as alternative mechanisms to return 
CO2 allowance value to households. Third, we discuss the role of behavioral issues in the 
potential design of a dividend program, which might enhance its effectiveness in helping to 
achieve related program goals. 
A. Philosophical Framework 
There are two defining aspects of climate change as an economic problem. First, the 
atmosphere is nonexclusive: absent some kind of regulation, it is impossible to restrict access to 
the atmosphere. Second, it is depletable: emissions from one source degrade the status of the 
environment for everyone. These characteristics define climate change as a common pool 
resource problem in economic theory. 
A fundamental question follows from that definition. Who owns a common pool 
resource? Or equivalently, perhaps, when the government decides to regulate access to a 
common pool resource by restricting supply and enforcing an intangible property right, as occurs 
with enforcement of a cap-and-trade program, to whom should the newly created property rights 
be assigned?  
A conventional interpretation of a common pool resource is that it is owned collectively 
by the parties who are affected by the resource or depend on its use. One example is when many 
parties have legal access to an oil reserve, a nonexclusive and depletable resource. A race to 
harvest the oil can reduce total productivity of the resource. This dilemma is often solved with a 
regulatory solution called unitization, which establishes shares and rates of extraction among the 
private parties to maximize the net present value of the resource. Another example is when the 
management and disposition of the resource are subject to political control, wherein each citizen 
in a political democracy has an equal voice in the determination of its outcome.  
Equal ownership of a common pool resource has practical meaning within a cap-and-
trade program. The value of emissions allowances represents the payment for environmental Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
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services (Boyce and Riddle 2007). The common pool aspect might imply that the payment for 
services, or in other words the value of emissions allowances, should be divided in equal 
amounts among the citizenry (Barnes 2001).  
The state of Alaska has experience with an annual transfer of dividends to households. 
The “permanent fund” in Alaska was created in 1976, and everyone who has lived in the state for 
at least 12 months is eligible to receive dividends from royalties on oil and gas extraction. 
Goldsmith (2004) suggests that people feel entitled to their share of the Alaska Permanent Fund 
because their dividends may be viewed as the disbursement of profits from an asset held in 
common by all residents. Framing the dividends in this way appears to popularize progressive 
income redistribution even though Alaskans recently revealed a preference for a demonstrably 
regressive sales tax over a progressive income tax. 
Another view would be that government functions as a trustee on behalf of its citizens, 
and its purpose should be utilitarian in trying to maximize the well-being of society. The 
government would be expected to search for an assignment of value resulting from the 
introduction of a price on CO2 that achieved this objective. This view would seem especially 
applicable in the context of an emissions tax. Under a tax, government might be expected to treat 
CO2 value as a new source of revenue that contributes to meeting the requirements of its budget. 
Using CO2 revenue to reduce preexisting taxes would be an investment in economic efficiency 
that would be likely to have positive effects throughout the income distribution by promoting 
economic growth, even if the immediate beneficiaries of the tax reduction are not distributed 
evenly. 
In summary, in the case of cap-and-trade, the creation of an intangible property right 
embodied in an emissions allowance conveys ownership of a common pool resource. The 
philosophical point of departure for a cap-and-trade program suggests the use of dividends. In 
contrast, in the case of an emissions tax, the government is presumed owner of the CO2 value, 
which would be treated like other sources of revenue.  
B. Practical Aspects of Climate Policy  
Mistrust of government appears to be high in the present era, and distaste for new taxes 
even higher. This is one reason that cap-and-trade has emerged as the current political option, 
rather than an emissions tax, and why dividends have attracted political support as an approach. 
The populist, egalitarian, antigovernment flavor of per capita dividends appeals to the politics of 
both the left and the right. Dividends also appear simple. Given that climate change is a problem Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
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characterized by fundamental uncertainty, a policy design that appears complicated is likely to 
heighten the uncertainty perceived by households (Blonz et al. 2010). In contrast, a simple 
design may counteract some of the perceived risk.  
Distribution of costs is another issue. The way that households use payments from the 
government appears sensitive to household income and the form of the payment. Dividends are 
expected to be progressive, and tax reform to be regressive. There are three distinct pieces of 
evidence that a dividend could contribute to the government’s progressive income distribution 
goals.  
First, looking at the Alaska Permanent Fund, Hsieh (2003) finds that households may 
anticipate dividends and smooth consumption over time. Hsieh argues this is possible because 
the formula for calculating dividends under the Alaska program is widely known, and 
newspapers accurately estimate the current year’s dividend months before delivery. In contrast, 
the same households that smooth consumption of their dividends fail to do so with their annual 
tax refund. This may be due to a combination of qualitative and quantitative difference between 
the two changes in income—namely, the dividend is larger (recently in the $1,500 range), and it 
is close to costless for consumers to learn the size of their future dividend with a large degree of 
accuracy. Second, Shapiro and Slemrod (2003) find that just under half of survey respondents 
said they would mostly pay debt with their 2001 tax rebate, versus about one-third who said they 
would mostly save it and the rest who said they would mostly spend it. They also find that 
households with high wealth in stocks spend their rebates at a significantly higher rate. Finally, 
on the lower end of the spectrum, Bertrand and Morse (2009) use a field survey of payday 
borrowers to conclude that the infusion of cash from rebates helped some borrowers significantly 
reduce their payday debt. 
Those three findings suggest that a dividend might simultaneously stimulate aggregate 
demand by high-wealth households while establishing a baseline level of income and relieving 
debt of some low-wealth households. But none of these outcomes suggest that the purchase of 
durable goods is a primary consequence of dividends, so they do not coincide with the goal of 
many existing government programs—to promote investment in energy-efficient household 
capital.  
C. Implications of Behavioral Issues for Dividend Program or Tax Cut 
The expenditure of money received through tax reductions or dividends is the sovereign 
decision of households. However, government might want to influence that decision with Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
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information or with incentives to promote household investments that increase the cost-
effectiveness of its own efforts. Is it possible to use information or incentives to leverage and 
expedite private sector investments in energy-related investments using revenues from tax 
reductions or dividends? 
Previous Experience with Tax Reductions and Dividends 
In 2001 taxpayers received a rebate in the form of a check delivered in a single payment. 
The literature on spending from the 2001 tax rebates indicates a low marginal propensity to 
consume on durable goods and services, which constitute capital purchases for households 
(Johnson et al. 2006). Evidence suggests that consumers initially used the 2001 rebates to pay 
down their credit card debts but resumed spending in the months that followed (Agarwal et al. 
2007).  
In Alaska, where dividends are returned on a per capita basis, Hsieh (2003) concludes 
that households effectively smooth consumption of their Alaska Permanent Fund dividends, and 
that dividends are not directed primarily to a boost in consumption of durable goods. This 
indicates that these dividends may be a good substitute for regular income. The evidence is 
consistent with the possibility that large expenditures on durables are more planned and therefore 
appear less responsive to one-time changes in income. Taking this one step further, tax 
reductions or dividends to households may not lead to greater purchases of household capital. 
However, to achieve program-related goals, the government may want to influence households to 
invest dividends toward the purchase of durable goods, such as energy-efficient appliances and 
vehicles. How might this occur?  
There is limited evidence about how households might be encouraged to allocate 
dividend funds within their household budget. Alaskans can open a college savings plan and 
directly allocate funds from their annual dividend to the fund, and 19,198 Alaska residents have 
contributed half of their dividends, totaling more than $64 million dollars (Clancy et al. 2009), to 
this option since 1991. A new effort to promote charitable giving has produced more moderate 
results. In 2009 the fund added a charity option called “Pick. Click. Give,” which in its first year Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
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achieved only a 1 percent participation rate.17 Across the nation, households have the opportunity 
to make charitable donations with tax refunds in 220 check-off programs available to taxpayers 
in 41 states and the District of Columbia. In 2000, total taxpayer donations to check-off 
programs reached $32.8 million (Federation of Tax Administrators 2003). 
New Policies to Affect Household Spending and Investment 
Thaler (1990, 1999) describes simple ways in which people might make savings-
consumption decisions. Thaler suggests people maintain assets, current income, and future 
income accounts in their heads. Changes in income affect the balances of these mental accounts 
in different ways according to idiosyncratic rules of thumb depending on the character of the 
change. For instance, a rule of thumb might be to use current income for current consumption, 
except in emergencies. If carbon auction revenues are returned as a dividend, and the dividend is 
large relative to regular income, it might be directed to the asset account. If it is relatively small, 
it might be directed to current income. This would result in an increase in savings or 
expenditures, respectively. Thus, smaller monthly installments might induce greater spending 
than the equivalent annual dividend.  
Thaler also argues that self-control is costly, which is why Social Security is a popular 
program, and people make decisions in the present that will limit their ability to spend savings in 
the future. In this light, smaller installments would make it more difficult for households to save 
enough to make energy-saving capital investments. Suppose the government wants to deliver the 
revenues in a way that would induce more capital investment, especially on energy-related 
capital. An annual dividend would impose a level of self-control promoting savings over the 
course of the year. But out of concern for cash-strapped households, the government also might 
be interested in monthly dividends so that household budgets are bolstered in the near term 
against increases in the prices of energy and other products. 
One way to link the two concerns would be to use default options. Several authors 
suggest the default setting is likely to affect the consumption and savings behavior of 
                                                 
17 Alaskans can donate a portion of their dividends (from $25 to the full amount) to eligible nonprofit organizations 
of their choice while they file online for their Permanent Fund dividends (Pick. Click. Give., 
http://www.pickclickgive.org/). In the first year of the program, more than 5,000 Alaskans donated about $545,000. 
If each donor gave the minimum amount, this represents about a 1 percent participation rate. Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
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households,18 especially when households lack experience or familiarity with the decision 
point.19 In the present context, a dividend program might automatically deposit monthly 
increments into an interest-bearing account. Recipients could still have immediate access to these 
funds by choosing to transfer funds to other accounts. However, interest earnings might be tax 
favored if funds are used for qualified purchases, thereby providing a nudge and an incentive to 
influence expenditure decisions. These and other elements of the design of a dividend program 
have not been widely explored, but might help to improve the efficiency of dividends or allow 
them to leverage greater cost-effectiveness from other program-related initiatives. 
More specifically, an approach embodied in proposed federal legislation (Cantwell and 
Collins, S. 2879) would enable recipients to borrow from future-year dividends to make qualified 
energy-related purchases in the present. This program could be characterized as a zero-interest 
loan. If the reason that households do not make cost-effective energy-related investments is 
liquidity constraints, a zero-interest loan would provide immediate net benefits for the 
household. Typically, a loan subsidy implies costs, including both the cost of capital and risk of 
default. With dividends as collateral, the risk of default is removed. Moreover, by coupling such 
incentives with information, the government may be able to affect the savings-consumption 
decisions of households in a way that would leverage greater private sector spending on energy-
related purchases than would occur otherwise.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines alternative ways that the value created by introducing a price on 
CO2 could be returned to households. We compare two bookend approaches. One approach 
would be to use revenues from an auction of CO2 emissions allowances to reduce preexisting 
taxes. Economic theory suggests this approach could substantially lower the overall cost of 
climate policy. The other is the direct refund of allowance value as per capita dividends, which 
would be more transparent and predictable. In an era of populist rancor about government policy, 
the dividend approach may have political appeal. 
                                                 
18 Thaler and Sunstein (2009). 
19 List (2003); Löfgren et al. (2010). Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
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The choice of approach has some relation to program design and the fundamental 
characteristics of the climate problem. The atmosphere is a nonexclusive and depletable 
resource, which defines its management as a common pool resource problem. If the government 
were to choose to implement a trading system by enforcing a property right that limits the supply 
of emissions allowances, then the common pool nature of the resource problem might imply that 
the property right should be distributed on an equal, per capita basis. If, instead, the government 
were to choose to introduce a tax on emissions, then the revenue would not be associated with an 
assignment of property rights to private parties. Although the use of allowance value to reduce 
preexisting taxes is expected to offer a substantial efficiency advantage, there may be ways that a 
dividend policy could be designed to help achieve program-related goals—by providing 
information or incentives to encourage households to use dividends to accelerate the investment 
in energy-efficient household capital.  
Finally, as we note that the enforcement of property rights under a cap-and-trade 
approach implies ownership, the notion of ownership is not necessarily a static one rooted just in 
either philosophical underpinnings or philology. Rather, the popular basis for the assignment of 
property rights may depend on social norms, which tend to evolve over time to rationalize 
behavior (Axelrod 1986). Raymond (2010) argues that social thought is influenced both by 
distributional justice and by efficiency, and over time a combination of these arguments can be 
successful in building a more successful political coalition. Norms may emerge that affect how 
people consider the ownership of atmospheric resources as well.20 Consequently, one might 
expect a hybrid policy to emerge that addresses both distributional and efficiency concerns.  
   
                                                 
20 Olmstead (1998) points out that informal institutions may emerge that effectively manage common pool 
resources. Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Parry 
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Table 1. Partial Illustrative Calculations of Costs of Cap-and-Trade  
and Regulatory Policies, 2020 
  
20 40 60
Target level of CO2 emissions, million tons 365 365 365
Assumed CO2 emissions in the absence of control policy 406 429 456
Proportionate emissions reduction below baseline level 0.10 0.15 0.20
Maximum revenue (100 percent allowance auctions), $billion 7.3 14.6 21.9
Policy costs with no prior tax distortions, $billion
1. Cap‐and‐trade  0.4 1.3 2.7
Regulatory alternative with coverage rate
a
2. 30 percent 1.4 4.3 9.1
3. 50 percent 0.8 2.6 5.5
4. 70 percent 0.6 1.8 3.9
Additional policy costs due to prior tax distortions, $billion
Cap‐and‐trade with full revenue‐recycling effect
5. Welfare gains from revenue recycling 2.6 5.1 7.7
6. Welfare loss from tax‐interaction effect 1.9 4.0 6.0
7. Total welfare cost
b ‐0.2 0.2 1.0
Cap‐and‐trade with no revenue recycling effect
8. Welfare loss from tax‐interaction effect 2.6 5.1 7.7
9. Total welfare cost




10. Welfare loss from tax‐interaction effect 0.3 1.1 2.3
11. Total welfare cost
b 1.7 5.4 11.4
50 percent
12. Welfare loss from tax‐interaction effect 0.2 0.6 1.4
13. Total welfare cost
b 1.0 3.2 6.8
70 percent
14. Welfare loss from tax‐interaction effect 0.1 0.5 1.0
15. Total welfare cost
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1 7,619 ‐1.14% 3.99% 1.72 811
2 15,522 ‐0.56% 2.37% 2.06 1,094
3 22,923 ‐0.55% 1.57% 2.53 1,074
4 30,479 ‐0.25% 1.34% 2.67 1,271
5 39,185 ‐0.13% 0.96% 2.90 1,152
6 49,040 0.02% 0.81% 3.01 1,415
7 60,604 0.18% 0.55% 3.04 1,280
8 76,718 0.30% 0.42% 3.00 1,387
9 100,525 0.33% 0.04% 3.41 1,627
10 182,186 0.40% ‐0.42% 3.44 1,981




Table 4. Unemployment Percentage of Labor Force 
 
 
Year National  CA 
1976 7.7  9.2 
1977 7.1 8.3 
1978 6.1  7.2 
1979 5.8 6.3 
1980 7.1  6.9 
1981 7.6 7.4 
1982 9.7  10.0 
1983 9.6 9.8 
1984 7.5  7.8 
1985 7.2 7.2 
1986 7.0  6.8 
1987 6.2 5.8 
1988 5.5  5.3 
1989 5.3 5.1 
1990 5.6  5.8 
1991 6.8 7.8 
1992 7.5  9.4 
1993 6.9 9.5 
1994 6.1  8.6 
1995 5.6 7.9 
1996 5.4  7.3 
1997 4.9 6.4 
1998 4.5  6.0 
1999 4.2 5.3 
2000 4.0  4.9 
2001 4.7 5.4 
2002 5.8  6.7 
2003 6.0 6.8 
2004 5.5  6.2 
2005 5.1 5.4 
2006 4.6  4.9 
2007 4.6 5.3 
2008 5.8  7.2 
2009 9.3 11.4 
Average 6.2  7.0 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 